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ANTI-STALKING LEGISLATION: DoEs IT PROTECT THE VICTIM
WmouT VIOLATING THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED?
I. INTRODUCTION*
Despite the threats he has made against our lives, despite his re-
peated violations of restraining orders, despite the professional
assessment of him as dangerous, both the District Attorney and
our own attorney have said nothing can be done until he has
"done something." What is the "something" they must wait for
him to do? Kidnap [my daughter]? Rape her? Kill her? Would
you be willing to sit back and wait for this to happen to your
daughter or your son?'
More and more stories like Mrs. Poland's are being heard by state
legislators in an effort to prompt them to pass anti-stalking laws.2 Tradi-
tionally associated with celebrities and politicians,3 stalking received na-
tional attention in 1989 with the shooting death of actress Rebecca
Schaeffer by a man who followed her for two years.4 In response to Ms.
Schaeffer's murder, along with the slayings of four other women in Or-
ange County within eighteen months, California passed the first piece of
"anti-stalking" legislation in 1990.5 In the past three years, forty eight
states followed California's lead and passed similar legislation.6
* The author would like to thank Professors J. Robert Brown, Penelope Bryan, and
Alan Chen for their editorial comments and suggestions throughout the drafting of this
Note.
1. Anti-Stalking Legislation, 1992: Hearings on S. 2922 Before the Senate Judiciay Comm.,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1992) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Mrs. Sandra Poland, vic-
tim's mother).
2. See, e.g., id.; infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
3. Celebrities actually comprise only 17 percent of stalking victims. Id. at 4 (testimony
of Maine Senator William S. Cohen).
4. Obsessed Fan Gets Life in Actress'Death, L. A. TnMEs, Dec. 22, 1991, at B5. Robert Bardo
followed Schaeffer for two years, sent her letters on numerous occasions, hired a detective to
get her address and enlisted the aid of his brother to buy him a gun. Id. He eventually shot
Schaeffer to death after he rang her doorbell and she answered. Id. He was sentenced to life
in prison without the possibility of parole. Id.
5. Sonya Live: Stalker Laws (CNN television broadcast, June 8, 1992) (statement of then
California State Senator Edward Royce). Royce has since been elected to the United States
House of Representatives and is currently involved in guiding federal anti-stalking legislation
through Congress. Karen J. Cohen, Royce Introduces Federal Stalking Bill States News Serv.,
Feb. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SNS File.
6. AlA. CODE §§ 13A-6-90 to -94 (Suipp. 1993); 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws 40 (to be codified
at ALAsA STAT. §§ 11.41.260-.270); Amz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921 (Supp. 1993); 1993 Ark.
Acts 379; CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); COLo. REv. STAT. § 18-9-111 (Supp.
1993); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 532-181c to -181d (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 1312A (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE. ANN.
§§ 16-5-90 to -91 (Michie Supp. 1993); HAw. REV. STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992), IDAHO
CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, paras. 5/12-7.3 to -7.4 (Smith-Hurd
1993); 1993 Ind. Legis. Ser. 242 (West) (to be codified at IND. CODE § 35-45-10); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 708.11 (West 1993); 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 298; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.130-150
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); -.& REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (West Supp. 1993); 1993
Me. Legis. Serv. 475 (West); 1993 Md. Laws 205 (to be codified at MD. CODE § 27-121B);
Mass. ANN. LAws ch. 265, § 43 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1993); MicH. Comp. LAws ANN.
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The rapid response by so many states confirms that a problem existed
with the application of traditional criminal laws to stalking situations. Cer-
tain behavior by stalkers, while understandably threatening to the victim,
did not rise to a level of culpability sufficient to allow for legal action.
7
Critics of anti-stalking laws, however, fear any legal intervention will
criminalize other constitutionally-protected activity.8 In September 1992,
the Senate Judiciary Committee was prompted by Senator William Cohen
to recognize the need for federal guidance in drafting constitutionally
sound legislation to provide relief for stalking victims.9 As a result, the
National Institute ofJustice conducted its own research into the issues and
§§ 750.411h-.411i (West Supp. 1993); MmN. STAT. ANN. § 609.747 (West Supp. 1993) (harass-
ment); 1992 Miss. Laws 532; 1993 Mo. Legis. Serv. 194 (Vernon); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
220 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-311.03 to .04 (Supp. 1992); 1993 Nev. Stat. 233; 1993 N.H.
Laws 173; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-3A-3 (Michie
Supp. 1993); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 120.13-15, 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.C. GE. STAT.
§ 14-277.3 (Supp. 1992); 1993 N.D. Laws 120; 1992 Ohio Laws 234; OnuA. STAT. ANN. ti. 21,
§ 1173 (West Supp. 1993); 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. 28 (Purdon); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-59-1 to -3
(Supp. 1992); 1992 S.C. Acts 417; S.D. CODUrD LAws ANN. § 22-19A (Supp. 1992); TENN.
CODE ANt. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1992); Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (West Supp. 1993);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-106.5 to -108 (Supp. 1993); 1993 Vt. Laws 95; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
60.3 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. Rzv. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA.
CODE § 61-2-9a (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.013 (West Supp. 1992) (harassment);
WYo. STAT. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1993).
7. Kenneth R. Thomas, Anti-Stalhing Statutes: Background and ConstitutionalAnalysis, CRS
REP. FOR CONG., Sept. 26, 1992, at 1. See infira part I discussing inadequacies of both civil and
criminal laws prior to stalking legislation enactment.
8. See, e.g., Sonya Live: Staler Laws, supra note 4 (statement of Loren Siegel, ACLU).
Ms. Siegel, concerned about potential abuse of the new laws, makes specific reference to
types of activities which may violate the stalking laws but may not be unconstitutional. Id.
Those activities include an investigative reporter seeking out the public figure who is the
subject of the report and a father, denied visitation rights to his children, who sits in a parked
car outside their school to make sure they are safe. Id.
9. S. 2922, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. (1992), states:
(A) FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS. - The Congress finds and declares that -
(1) The Criminal Act of stalking other persons is a problem of deep concern;
(2) previously available legal recourse against stalking, such as restraining
orders, have proven largely ineffective; (3) anti-stalking legislation has been
enacted or proposed by several of the states; (4) the constitutionality of sev-
eral of the states' anti-stalking statutes may be in question; and (5) the Con-
gress has an interest in assisting the states in enacting anti-stalking legislation
that is constitutional and enforceable.
(B) EVALUATION - The Attorney General, acting through the Director of
The National Institute of Justice, shall - (1) evaluate anti-stalking legislation
and proposed anti-stalking legislation in the states; (2) develop model anti-
stalking legislation that is constitutional and enforceable; (3) prepare and
disseminate to state authorities the findings made as a result of the evalua-
tion; and (4) not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act,
report to the Congress the findings and the need or appropriateness of fur-
ther action by the Federal Government.
(C) EXPENSES - Expenses incurred in conducting the evaluation and de-
veloping model legislation under subsection (B) shall be paid out of funds
that are available to the National Institute of Justice for fiscal year 1992.
Id.
Senator Cohen introduced the bill on July 1, 1992. Id. On September 29, 1992, the
SenateJudiciary Committee held hearings on the bill with testimony or statements offered by
the following- Senator William S. Cohen (Maine), Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (Califor-
nia), Ms. Jane McAllister (victim), Mrs. Sandra Poland (victim's mother), Honorable Perry
Bullard (chairman, House Judiciary Committee, Michigan State Legislature), and Mr.
Charles B. Dewitt (Director National Institute of Justice). Hearings, supra note 1, at iii.
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was scheduled to present model legislation to Congress by September 30,
1993.10 During the spring of 1993, two other major pieces of federal legis-
lation were introduced - one to define stalking as a federal offense I" and
one to reduce the incidence of stalking.12
This Note analyzes the various anti-stalking measures in effect with
specific attention to the constitutional issues presented. Part II discusses
the traditional criminal and civil measures available to stalking victims,
and the deficiencies of these measures. Part III surveys the types of anti-
stalking statutes passed and the areas they address. Part IV explores con-
stitutional questions raised by the statutes surveyed. Finally, this Note con-
cludes that a delicate balance must be struck between the rights of the
victim and of the accused in order for anti-stalking legislation to be effec-
tive and constitutional.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Inadequacies of Traditional Criminal and Civil Domestic Violence
Remedies
Estimates indicate 4600 reported stalking incidents in the United
States in 1991.13 Stalkers threaten, follow, or harass approximately
10. Matt Neufield, Area Officials Praise U.S. Support for Anti-Stalking Laws, WASH. TiAmS,
Dec. 25, 1992, at B3. TheJustice Department announced in 1992 that it would help fund the
project. Id. The project is being run by the private nonprofit National CriminalJustice Asso-
ciation, the Federal National Institute ofJustice, the American Civil Liberties Union and at
least ten other groups. Id. See Lynne Marek, Caucus Pushes for More Female Appointees, Cm.
Tin., Apr. 25, 1993, at 11. The federal project will study existing domestic violence and and-
stalking laws, mental health commitment statutes, telephone harassment laws and anti-tres-
passing ordinances as well as gather information on stalking cases before submitting its re-
port to Congress. Area OffidIals Praise U.S. Support for Anti-Stalking Laws, supra note 9. As of
the date of this publication, the model legislation and the report -to Congress are almost
complete. Telephone Interview with Charles Lauer, National Institute of Justice (Aug. 5,
1993).
11. S. 470, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Democratic Senator Robert Kreuger from
Texas, himself a stalking victim, cosponsored S. 470. See id.; Washington Briefs, DALLAS MoRN-
INo NEws, Mar. 3, 1993, at 6A. The bill defines stalking as threats and harassment that occur
on federal property such as military bases or Indian reservations and through the use of
telephones, the mail or other interstate commerce. S. 470; see Cohen, supra note 3. Penalties
range from two to five years for a first 9ffense and five to ten years for a second offense. S.
470.
12. H.R. 840, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill was introduced February 4, 1993 by
Joseph Kennedy, a Democratic Representative frofh Massachusetts, and requires all states to
enact anti-stalking legislation by September 30, 1994 or lose 25% of their Crime Act Funding.
Id. Given that 49 states have already passed anti-stalking laws, Kennedy's goal seems well
within reach.
H.R. 840 also requires the Bureau ofJustice to establish a national database on stalking
and domestic violence to permit tracking stalkers from state to state and improve communi-
cations between jurisdictions. Id. This provision seems particularly helpful for enforcement
of restraining orders against stalkers who follow their victims into other states where officials
are unaware of existing restraining orders. See Penny Bender, Biden. Chastises Delaware on Ac-
tions in Stalking Cases, Gannett News Serv., Mar. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
GNS File.
13. Illinois Governor Signs Anti-Stalking Bill, UPI, July 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File.
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200,000 people each year.' 4 Although stalking incidents against men do
occur, most victims are women stalked either by strangers or even more
likely, by former husbands or boyfriends.' 5 In 1992, 1500 women died at
the hands of their husbands or boyfriends,' 6 - ninety percent of whom
may have been stalked prior to the fatal attack. 17 Park Dietz, an expert in
clinical psychiatry, predicts that five percent of women in the general pop-
ulation will experience harassment at some time during their lives.' 8
The activity of stalking involves repeated following, harassing, or
threatening another or acting in such a way as to create a credible threat
of harm in the mind of the victim.' 9 Evidence of physical abuse is
unnecessary.
2 0
Domestic violence, however, is generally defined as any act carried
out with the intention of, or perceived intention of, physically injuring
one's spouse.2 ' Examples include, inter alia, slapping, hitting, punching,
kicking, or throwing objects,2 2 all involving an immediate physical pres-
ence between the abuser and the victim.
The insufficiency of domestic violence laws in the stalking context are
readily apparent. Domestic violence requires a physical component that
most often does not exist in stalking cases until it is too late.2 3 In addition,
stalkers may or may not know their victims, unlike domestic abuse situa-
tions.2 4 Yet, prior to 1990, the only remedies available to a stalking victim
14. Penny Bender, Survivors Ask for Federal Anti-Stalking Legislation, Gannett News Serv.,
Mar. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File.
15. Melinda Beck et al., Murderous Obsession, NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1992 at 60. A tragic
example is recounted by the surviving parents of Glenn Beach and Karen Erjavec. See id.
Karen met Ken Kopecky a wedding. Id. Even though Karen was already dating Glenn Beach,
Ken Kopecky became infatuated with Karen. Id. After months of harassment and vandalism,
Ken Kopecky entered the Beaches' home and shot Glenn six times in the back and stabbed
him twice. Id. Karen was shot in the head at close range. Id.
16. Joseph Kirby, Law Enforcement Takes a New Approach to Domestic Vwlence, Cn. Tram.,
Aug. 23, 1992, at A3. A study released by the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta reported
that four to eight million women are victims of domestic violence each year and that domes-
tic abuse may be responsible for more injuries to women than minor auto accidents, rapes
and muggings combined. See id. The Justice Department reports that of all violent acts per-
petrated against women, 9% are by husbands, 35% are by ex-husbands and 32% are by boy-
friends. See Nightline: Anti-Stalking Laws, (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 3, 1992).
17. See Beck et al., supra note 15, at 60.
18. Maria Puente, Legislators Tackling the Ten-or of Stalking, But Some Experts Say Measures
Are Vague, USA TODAY, July 21, 1992, at 9A.
19. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
20. See infra part .A.
21. See Steven M. Cook, Transition: Domestic Abuse Legislation in Illinois and Other States: A
Survey and Suggestions for Reform, 1983 U. IL. L. Ray. 261 n.2 (1983).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Beck et al., supra note 15 (young couple murdered by known stalker, no
prior attempted physical injury); Obsessed Fan Gets Life in Actress'Death, supra note 4 and text
therein (actress murdered by stalker after two years of stalking and no prior attempted physi-
cal injury or contact); Sonya Live: Stalker Laws, supra note 5 (police told stalking victim "[I]et
us know when he attacks you physically, and then we can get involved").
24. See Rene Riley-Adams, Can Laws Stop the Obsessed?, The Times, Feb. 22, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Times File. Stalkers typically emanate from three different scena-
rios: those who create a relationship with someone whom they have never met, usually a
celebrity;, those who exaggerate a cursory relationship into something obsessive; and, those
who cannot let go of an actual soured relationship. See id.
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came from existing domestic violence laws.2 5 These traditional remedies,
designed to rescue women from abusive boyfriends or spouses, quickly
proved inadequate to victims of stalkers.
2 6
1. Criminal Remedies
Prior to the enactment of stalking laws, virtually no criminal sanctions
existed to protect the victim. While stalkers engaged in behavior obviously
threatening to the victim, their conduct did not always rise to the level of a
criminal violation.2 7 The crime of assault, for example, requires an indi-
vidual who attempts to place or places another in reasonable apprehen-
sion of being subjected to immediate physical harm.2 8 In most instances of
stalking, unlike domestic violence, the proximity requirement for assault
does not exist.29 As long as the stalker remained far enough away from
the victim that a reasonable person would not feel immediately
threatened, no assault occurred.
Types of conduct often reported by victims of stalkers include: harass-
ing letters and threatening phone calls, repeated driving by the victim's
house, sitting in a car watching the victim, following the victim down the
street, and appearing at all times and all places.3 ° None of this conduct is
a per se violation of the law except perhaps the phone calls.3 ' Gathered
together in the mind of one person, however, these activities cause great
25. California enacted the first anti-stalking legislation in 1990. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9
(West Supp. 1993).
26. See Hearing of the SenateJudiciaiy Committee; Fed. News Serv., Mar. 10, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File. In her confirmation hearings, Janet Reno stated that
"under the laws that existed prior to the anti-stalking law, it was impossible to perfect - or
develop evidence sufficient to prosecute." Id.
27. Thomas, supra note 7, at 3.
28. RoLjN M. PERxmis & RoNA.D N. BoYcE, CRrmmNAL LAw 163 (3d ed. 1982).
29. See, e.g., Beck et al., supra note 15 (young couple murdered by known stalker who
mailed threatening letters, made threatening phone calls, and vandalized property).
30. See generally, Michael Matza, When Attraction Turns Obsessive It May Seem Harmless. But
to Victims, Stalking Means a Life of Fear, PHnIA. INQUmER, May 23, 1993, at Al (discussing need
for anti-stalking law where stalking occurs under similar situations); Beck, supra note 15, at 60
(discussing legislatures' responses to similar acts); Max Albright, Tired of Not Living at All;
Amarillo Woman's Plight Highlights Need for Stalking Law, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 13, 1992, at 3
(stalkers repeated phone calls, following the victim, coming to her house, and ignorance of
peace bonds highlighted need for anti-stalking legislation in Texas); Sonya Live: Stalker Laws,
supra note 5 (discussing California's stalking law); Sonya Live: Stalking, (CNN television broad-
cast, Oct. 2, 1992) (discussing whether stalking should be a crime).
One stalking victim is Tammy Acker, now 19, who received numerous letters and gifts
over the last four years from a man she knew casually through a church group. Matza, supra
One note, written to Tammy's sister when Tammy was fifteen, requested explicit information
about Tammy. Id. The note read, "I need numbers (example 36-24-36) so that I can buy her
nice things and maybe a few naughty things for a honeymoon," and was eventually traced to
a man who drove a gold Chevrolet Beretta repeatedly past Tammy's house. Id. Tummy was
unable to get a restraining order against her harasser because they were never romantically
involved. Id.
31. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (West Supp. 1993). In Texas, telephone harassment
is a Class B misdemeanor punishable by six months in jail and a $1500 fine. TEx. PENAL
CoDE ANN. § 12.22 (West 1993); See also Albright, supra note 31, at 3. A federal violation may
result in up to $50,000 in fines or six months imprisonment, or both. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)
(1988).
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fear and intimidation.3 2 Such fear certainly acts to infringe upon one's
individual freedoms.
3 3
Those who did violate the law, perhaps under telephone harassment
laws, usually committed only misdemeanors and ended up with' fines or
probation.3 4 The resulting arrest without subsequent prosecution or in-
carceration often served to aggravate the circumstances for the victim.
3 5
Mr. Dietz found "as a general rule, [the arrest] is perceived by the mentally
ill stalker as a confirmation of the relationship, and by the less seriously ill
stalker as an angering challenge." 6 Under previous criminal laws, the
stalker who continued to haunt, harass, or frighten a victim in full view of
a police officer committed no crime.
3 7
2. Civil Remedies
The primary civil remedy available to a stalking victim, and the only
basis upon which an individual can prevent another from approaching
her, her home or her work, is a protective order.38 A court will order
someone to maintain a certain distance from another upon sufficient
proof of a rational fear of imminent harm in the mind of the victim.
3 9
Violations of the order generally result in contempt proceedings with pen-
alties ranging from six months to a year in jail.40 In some states, a viola-
tion constitutes a misdemeanor and/or contempt or, a felony and/or
contempt.
4 1
32. See e.g., Sonya Live, supra note 5. Fifteen year-old Erin Tavegia reported to the police
every time she was followed home from school by a 49 year old man over a 14 month period.
Id. He offered her money and rides home. Id. The police had an eight-inch thick file on the
stalker but he had not broken any laws, and all the police could tell Erin's mother was to
protect her. Id. Erin's mother said of the stalking, "It was absolutely terrifying." Id.
33. A stalker's actions may violate certain fundamental constitutional rights because of
the constant following and spying. Freedom to associate and privacy are constitutionally pro-
tected rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 462 (1957).
34. Thomas, supra note 7, at 3-4.
35. See Puente, supra note 18.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Sonya Live: Stalker Laws, supra note 5. The police had a video tape of the
stalker on three separate occasions offering fifteen year old Erin Tavegia money, speaking to
her, always bordering on being sexual. Id. Despite the existence of an eight inch thick file
on the stalker, the police refused to act and merely warned her mother to "protect her." Id.
38. Thomas, supra note 7, at 3-4. Other remedies may include common law actions for
damages grounded in trespass, invasion of privacy, assault, or intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Robert A. GuyJr., The Nature and Constitutionaliy of Staling Laws, 46 VA~N. L
REv. 991, 997 (1993).
39. See Thomas, supra note 7, at 3-4. A typical restraining order prevents the stalker
from coming within two hundred yards of the victim. See, e.g., George LardnerJr., The Stah-
ing of Kristin; The Law Made It Easy for My Daughter's Killer, WASH. PoST, Jan. 22, 1992, at Cl.
40. Cook, supra note 21, at 272, 272 n.78 and statutes cited therein.
41. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 14-4-105, 18-1-106, -6-803.5 (Supp. 1993) (sentences
range from six months to eighteen months in duration and may constitute a misdemeanor or
felony and also permits recourse under civil or criminal contempt); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3110 (1983) (no sentence stated for contempt); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-32-01, 14-07.1-06
(1985 & Supp. 1993) (sentences range from one year to five years and violation is both a
misdemeanor and contempt or felony and contempt).
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Protective order legislation was initially enacted to provide immediate
relief to victims of domestic abuse.42 Thought to be the perfect solution,
such orders offered victims physical protection aswell as ordering the of-
fender to provide financial support where the offender previously pro-
vided the household income.43 Problems quickly surfaced, however,
which made the effectiveness of protective orders in stalking situations
clearly inadequate. 44
First, unlike criminal remedies that place the burden on the criminal
justice system to seek out violators and prosecute them, civil protection
orders require the victim to come up with sufficient evidence of an immi-
nent threat.45 The victim must keep track of constant "violations" by the
stalker and be able to present enough evidence to satisfy the court to issue
a restraining order.
46
In domestic violence cases, the plaintiff must show the defendant at-
tacked, beat, molested, or otherwise threatened bodily harm.47 Often
times the plaintiff wears her evidence to court as a black eye or a swollen
lip. No similar physical evidence exists for stalking victims upon which to
base the need for protection.48 Many stalking victims resort to keeping
track of letters received, phone calls or visits from the stalker in order to
capture the court's attention.49 Sometimes the victim's word against the
stalker's offers the only proof available. The victim's word alone may be
unconvincing if a judge or prosecutor harbors any 'lingering attitudes
about unnecessary domestic violence claims.50
A second and perhaps greater problem involves the enforcement of
restraining orders, sometimes referred to as "paper shields."5 1 According
to a federal study done by the Urban Institute in'Washington, D.C., only
twenty percent of restraining orders violated result in arrests. 52 All too
42. Cook, supra note 21, at 272.
43. Id. at 273-74. Typical relief includes support payments.for any children and restitu-
tion for out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the victim. Id. Because each state's legislation
varies significantly'in its scope of relief, the reader should review her own applicable state
statute. Id. at 274 n.84.
44. Thomas, supra note 7, at 4.
45. Id.
46. See id. Senator Robert Krueger and his wife endured visits, calls in the middle of the
night, and threatening notes for four years before the police could arrest the man respohsi-
ble. Bender, supra note 14. Senator Krueger has a "pile of letters and answering machine
tapes... many with threats that were obscene and graphic." Id.
47. See Rebecca S. Bromley, Injunctive Rmedies for Interpersonal Violence, 18 CoLo. LAw.
1743 (1989); Cook, supra note 21, at 261 n.2, 272.
48. See supra notes 21, 28-29 and accompanying text.
49. Nightline, supra note 16; see e.g., supra note 46 and accompanying text.
50. See Cook, supra note 21, at 269; see genera/!y, GuyJr., supra note 38, at 999 ("Prosecu-
tors sometimes are hesitant to press for harassment convictions because the punishment is
too light to effect deterrence."). Manyjudges, when faced with domestic abuse cases, do not
feel the court should get involved in family arguments, and believe that reconciliation within
the family is preferred to criminal punishment of the husband. See Cook, supra, at 269.
These same judges, when presiding over the case of a woman being stalked by her ex-hus-
band, may also refuse to get the courts involved. See id.
51. See Kevin Fagan, New Focus onDeadly Sta/hers, S.F. CHRoN, Jan. 11, 1993,at Al.
52. Fawn Germer, Arrests Rare for Abusers Who Violate Orders, Roczv MTN. NEws, Aug. 29,
1993, at 4A.
1993]
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often enforcement happens too infrequently and too late. 53 Most stalkers
know that restraining orders are rarely enforced.54 Others discover that
some protective orders only last for a limited period of time, and simply
wait them out.
55
In the minds of those desperate for attention from their prey, re-
straining orders present no real barrier. To those victims of stalking des-
perate for some relief from the incessant fear, the orders prove similarly
meaningless.
III. A SuRvEY OF STATE STALKING LEGISLATION
In response to the murder of four young women in California within
a month and a half, California enacted the first anti-stalking law in order
to bridge the gap between existing domestic violence remedies and the
needs of stalking victims.5 6 Each had obtained temporary restraining or-
ders against her attacker; each communicated with her family, her friends,
and the police that she thought she was going to be killed.5 7 Despite all
the resources available to protect these women, they all died.
5 8
As of August 1993, forty-eight other states have followed California's
lead.5 9 Oregon's statute, the only one yet to be enacted, is currently pend-
ing in committee. 60 Sadly, the approval for these statutes often came only
after a violent and brutal attack on a member of that community.6 1 Some
53. See Beck et al., supra note 15, at 60. Kristin Lardner, whose death motivated Senator
Cohen to propose federal anti-stalking legislation, sought and received a one-year protection
order against her ex-boyfiend in mid-May 1992. Heafings, supra note 1, at 15. He shot and
beat her to death on a Boston street on May 30, 1992. Id.
54. See Cook, supra note 21, at 275; Thomas, supra note 7, at 5. When originally written,
most domestic abuse legislation did not provide police with proper procedures for enforce-
ment of civil protective orders. See Cook, supra, at 275 nn.94-95. Some statutes did not pro-
vide any authority to enforce them and, as a result, police officers either felt or were
powerless to arrest the violator. See id. In addition, police officers, like some judges, were
traditionally more concerned with making peace in the household than in making an arrest.
See Kirby, supra note 16, at A3. These attitudes have changed more recently. See id.
55. See Sonya Live: Stalker Laws, supra note 5. Temporary restraining orders generally
last about 48 hours. Id.; see generally Cook, supra note 22, at 273 n.81 for citations to various
state statutes.
56. CA. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993). See infra note 172 for full text of
statute.
57. Sonya Live: Stalker Laws, supra note 5.
58. See id. One woman had been stalked for ten years. Id. The stalker followed her
from Germany and threatened to kill her if she ever got married. Id. The stalker murdered
her even though she had obtained a temporary restraining order against him. Id.
59. See statutes cited supra note 6..
60. Or. S. 833, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993).
61. See, e.g., Illinois Governor Signs Anti-Stalking Bill, supra note 13. Steven Johnson alleg-
edly stalked his estranged wife, then shot her in the parking lot of a suburban Chicago store
on July 7, 1992. Id. Illinois' anti-stalking law passed onJuly 12, 1992. ILl. ANN. STAT. ch. 720,
para. 5/12-7.3 to -7.4 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
Colorado's legislature approved a bill to discourage stalkers in response to the shooting
of a Fort Collins woman by her ex-husband on the steps of the police station where she
sought refuge. Peggy Lowe; Bracelet Designed to Deter Stalkers of Women, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1992, at B6. Wisconsin acted after a stalking victim was fatally stabbed 19 times and Virginia
responded to a mother's account of a stalker who murdered then burned her daughter's
body. Beck et al., supra note 15, at 60.
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states passed laws which took immediate or emergency effect. 62 This sec-
don presents a general survey of the types of statutes passed and the issues
they address.
A. "Stalking" Defined
Typically, the offense of stalking involves a particular course of con-
duct coupled with the requisite intent. Most statutes define the conduct as
willful, malicious and repeated following or harassing of another person.63
The intent requirement usually includes either a credible threat of vio-
lence towards the victim,6 or knowingly placing the victim in fear of death
or bodily injury.
65
Some states use broader language to define both elements of stalk-
ing,66 while others are more specific.. 7 Initially, West Virginia had the
most narrowly drawn provision, requiring the defendant to:
intentionally and closely follow, lie in wait,; or make repeated
threats to cause bodily injury to any person with whom that per-
son formerly resided or cohabited or with whom that person for-
merly engaged in a sexual or intimate relationship, with the
intent to cause said person emotional distress or place said per-
son in fear of his personal safety.6
The previous relationship requirement presented some concerns in rela-
tion to prosecution under this statute because the stalker and victim often
62. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-9-111 (Supp. 1993); HAw. REv. STAT. § 711.1106.5 (Supp.
1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3 to -7.4
(Smith-Hurd 1993) OKLA. STAT. ANN. tiL 21 § 1173 (West Supp. 1993); 1993 Pa. Laws 28;
TEx. PENAL CODE ANNm. § 42.07 (West Supp. 1993).
63. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 265, § 43;
1992 Ohio Laws 234; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110 (West Supp. 1993).
64. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 649.9. "Credible threat" is most often defined as a threat
made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person
who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. See id. Many states also
protect the immediate family members subject to any credible threat by the defendant. See,
e.g., id.; IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173(A) (West Supp.
1993); Wvo. STAT. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1993). Hawaii broadens the definition to include harm
to the victim or "another." HAw. REv. STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992).
65. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90 (Supp. 1993). New Hampshire requires the stalker to
threaten death or bodily injury. 1993 N.H. Laws 173.
66. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.130 (Mchie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992) (defining
the offense of stalking as engaging in an intentional course of conduct directed at a specific
person(s) which seriously alarms, annoys, intimidates or harasses the person, and which
serves no legitimate purpose); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315(a)(1) (Supp. 1992) (stalking
occurs when a person "[i]ntentionally and repeatedly follows a specific person; . . . or
[i]ntentionally commits a series of other acts evidencing a continuity of purpose to seriously
alarm, annoy or harass a specific person... . "). Virginia's statute reaches further to one who
"engages in conduct with intent to cause emotional distress to another person by placing that
person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury.. . . "VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie
Supp. 1993).
67. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90 (Michie Supp. 1993) (outlining the type of threat
required and specifying that the suspect must physically appear near the victim somewhere
other than at the defendant's home); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3 (Smith-Hurd
1993) (same). Illinois also requires the appearance to occur on more than one occasion. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3.
68. W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (1992).
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times do not know one another.69 West Virginia has since adopted a more
victim-favorable statute. 70 Some states, such as Minnesota, specifically pro-
vide that the relationship between the stalker and victim does not
matter.
7 1
A minority ofjurisdictions provide that the mere occurrence of partic-
ular conduct under the statute, without any threat or intent to harm, con-
stitutes stalking.72 Both Florida and Mississippi define stalking as willfully,
maliciously and repeatedly following or harassing another person or mak-
ing a credible threat.73 Statutes, like Florida's, present particular potential
constitutional dilemmas with regard to vagueness.
74
The harshest stalking law to date exists in Michigan where the victim
need only establish a reasonable fear of harm to meet the statute's require-
ment.75 In order to avoid some of the enforcement concerns raised about
other states' laws, the Michigan State Legislature chose to focus on the
harm to the victim rather than the mind of the defendant.76 This elimi-
nates the need for victims to convince authorities that the stalker intends
to harm them.
77
Other states, including Arizona,78 Maine, 79 Minnesota,8 0 and New
York,8 ' passed laws which do not specifically address stalking, but essen-
69. See Puente, supra note 18, at 9A; Riley-Adams, supra note 24; Hearings, supra note 1, at
34 (statement of Sandra Poland).
70. 1993 W. Va. Acts 30 (to be codified at W. VA CODE § 61-2-9a). The amendment to
the stalking statute, in pertinent part, provides:
Any person who knowingly, willfully and repeatedly follows and harasses another
person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in
reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be incarcerated in the countyjail for not more
than six months or fined more than one thousand dollars, or both.
Id.
71. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.748(1) (West Supp. 1993).
72. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048
(West. Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1992); 1992 Miss. Laws 532; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1992). Kansas, while not requiring any threat from the stalker, nar-
rowly defines the conduct necessary to commit stalking as "willful, malicious and repeated
following and barassment... ." 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 298 (emphasis added).
73. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (Supp. 1993); 1992 Miss. Laws 532.
74. See discussion infra part III.A.
75. MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.411h (West Supp. 1993).
76. Hearings, supra note 1, at 64 (statement of Michigan State Representative Perry Bul-
lard). Statutes that require an intent to harm rely on the mental state of the defendant. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993). The victim must convince the authorities
that the requisite intent existed in the stalker's mind. See, e.g., id. Michigan's legislature
decided to ease the burden on the victim by relying instead on the victim's "reasonable fear."
See CNN News: Michigan Legal System Takes Stalking Very Seriously (CNN television broadcast,
Jan. 1, 1993).
77. CN News, supra note 76.
78. Asuz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921 (Supp. 1993).
79. 1993 Me. Legis. Serv. 475 (West).
80. MnNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.748 (West Supp. 1993).
81. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1993). The New York statute, in perti-
nent part, states:
A person is guilty of harassment in the first degree when he or she intentionally
and repeatedly harasses another person by following such person in or about a pub-
lic place or places by engaging in a course of conduct or by repeatedly committing
acts which places such person in reasonable fear of physical injury.
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dally apply to the same type of conduct. For example, Minnesota's "har-
assment" law involves repeated, intrusive, or unwanted acts, words or
gestures intended to adversely affect the safety, security or privacy of an-
other.8 2 Maine's legislature expanded their harassment law to prohibit
engaging in behavior associated with stalking after a warning by any "sher-
iff, deputy sheriff, constable, police officer or justice of the peace," or by
court order.
83
B. Types of Conduct
Generally the conduct involved includes some type of pattern over a
period of time with a specific continuity of purpose.8 4 Some statutes re-
quire the conduct to occur on more than one occasion.8 5 Some excep-
tional provisions include harassment by telephone,8 6 fax,8 7 or "placing an
object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased or occupied
by that person."88 Due to potential constitutional vagueness or First
Amendment issues,8 9 most statutes highlight specific areas of activity not
included, most importantly "constitutionally protected conduct."90 Unfor-
tunately, this phrase alone does little to offset any vagueness concerns. 9 1
Other types of conduct explicitly excluded from prosecution under anti-
stalking laws include: labor picketing;92 that in furtherance of law en-
forcement;93 of a reporter;94 of a private detective;95 of a process server;
96
or, during the course of a lawful business activity.
9 7
Id. The New York law is designed to address "the repetitive type of stalking conduct" previ-
ously unrecognized. Gary Spencer, State Tightens PenaltiesforStalking, N.Y. .J., Aug. 20, 1992,
at 1.
82. MtNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.748 (West Supp. 1993).
83. 1993 Me. Legis. Serv. 475 (West).
84. See, eg., CAI.. PENAL CODE § 646.9(d) (West Supp. 1993).
85. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992); Mcm. Comp. LAws ANN.
§ 750.411h (West Supp. 1993).
86. 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws 40; MoNT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 (1993); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-509
(Supp. 1993).
87. 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws 40; WYo. STAT. §16-2-509.
88. 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws 40.
89. See discussion infra part MI.A
90. See, e.g., IDAHo CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1992); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.130
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992). Michigan State Representative Perry Bullard, testifying
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, believed that his legislature drafted an anti-stalking
law which was both enforceable and constitutional. Hearings, supra note 1, at 64. See MicH.
Comp. Laws ANN. § 750.411h (West Supp. 1993). Although conduct previously legal would
now be illegal under the law, Bullard stressed that the legislature included a detailed set of
definitions which focus on the harm to the victim rather than the specific mental intent of
the stalker. Id. See n.97 infra and accompanying text.
91. See discussion infra part IHA'
92. CAI. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); DE. CODE ANN tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp.
1992) (creates a rebuttable presumption against stalking if during labor activity); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 720, Para. 5/12-7.3, 7.4 (Smith-Hurd 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.05 (Supp.
1992).
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A.
94. 1993 Nev. Stat. 233.
95. Id.
96. 1993 Ark. Acts 379.
97. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-92 (Michie Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315
(Supp. 1992).
1993]
DENVER UNVfRSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1
C. Penalties
1. Jail and Fines
Thirty-six out of the forty-nine states with stalking laws provide both
misdemeanor and felony classifications. 98 A first offense may draw up to
one year in jail and a $1000 fine. 9 Subsequent offenders sometimes incur
higher penalties ranging from two to five years1 00 in jail and $1,000 to
$10,000 in fines.10 1 The range of subsequent penalties depends on such
factors as: whether a protective order was violated,' 0 2 the victim's age, 10 3
or whether a deadly weapon was involved.
10 4
Nine states provide only misdemeanor classifications,' 0 5 with Utah re-
quiring only six months in jail per offense.' 0 6 In contrast, Alabama, Ar-
kansas, Delaware, and Illinois maintain felony classifications with penalties
ranging from six months to twenty years.
10 7
Few statistics exist regarding prosecutions and convictions under
stalking laws because they are so new. The Judicial Council of California
98. 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws 40; CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 532-181c to -181d; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 784.048(2), (3) (West Supp. 1993). GA.
CODE. ANN. §§ 16-5-90 to -91 (Michie Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1992);
1993 Ind. Legis. Serv. 242 (West) (to be codified at IND. CODE § 35-45-10); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 708.11 (West 1993); Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 508-130-150 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992);
L.A. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (West Supp. 1993); 1993 Me. Legis. Serv. 475 (West); MAss.
ANN. LAWs. ch. 265, § 43 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1993); MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 750.411h-.411i
(West Supp. 1993); MmN. STAT. § 609.748 (West Supp. 1993); 1992 Miss. Laws 532; 1993 Mo.
Legis. Serv. 194 (Vernon); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-311.03
to -311.04 (Supp. 1992); 1993 Nev. Stat. 233; 1993 N.H. Laws 173; 1993 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-
3A-3 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 120.13-.15, 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1993);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3 (Supp. 1992); 1993 N.D. Laws 120; 1992 Ohio Laws 234; OnA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173 (West Supp. 1993); 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. 28 (Purdon); R.I. GEN.
LAws §§ 11-59-1 to -3 (Supp. 1992); S.D. CODn a LAws ANN. § 22-19A (Supp. 1992); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1992); Tmx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (West Supp. 1993); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1993); 1993 Vt. Laws 95; WASH. Ray. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.46.110 (West Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.013 (West Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. § 6-
2-506 (Supp. 1993).
99. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 18-7905(b), 1992 S.C. Acts 417.
100. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws'ch. 265, § 43.
101. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110
102. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 532-181c, 181d; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.130.
103. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 532-181c. Connecticut upgrades stalking in the sec-
ond degree, a misdemeanor, to a first degree felony offense if the victim is under sixteen
years of age. Id.
104. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.130.
105. Am. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921 (Supp. 1993); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 18-9-111 (Supp.
1993); HAW. REv. STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992); 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 298; 1993 Md. Laws
205 (to be codified at MD. CODE § 27-121B); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10 (West Supp. 1993);
1992 S.C. Acts 417; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-91
(Supp. 1993).
106. UTAH CODE ANN. § 765-106.5 (1992).
107. SeeAi.A. CODE §§ 13-A-690 to -91 (Supp. 1993); 1993 Ark. Acts 379; DEL- CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3 to -7.4 (Smith-Hurd
1993). Illinois created a higher level of felony for "aggravated stalking" committed by a
stalker who causes bodily harm, confines or restrains a victim or violates a court order. Id. A
second or subsequent conviction for aggravated stalking may result in up to seven years of
imprisonment. See Donna Hunzeker, Stalking L.aws, 17 ST. LEGIS. REP. 19, Oct. 1992, at 1.
Alabama also has an aggravated stalking statute. AL&. CODE § 13-A-6-91. A violation consti-
tutes a class B felony punishable for up to twenty years in prison. Id. at § 13-A-5-6 (1975).
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reports that through December 31, 1991 ten persons received convictions
and sentences under California's 1990 stalking law.108 In November 1992,
Chicago sentenced its first defendant under the new Illinois law to two
years in prison after he pled guilty.1 9
In December 1992, the first trial under Illinois' statute resulted in the
defendant's acquittal. 110 The jury's verdict confirmed some critics' fears
about the filing of false claims."' The defendant's wife accused him of
telephoning and threatening to kill her and intimidating her at her place
of employment. 1 2 The defense argued that she was angry that her ex-
husband failed to appear at their divorce proceedings. 113 Thejury delib-
erated for less than an hour. 1 4 By that time, the defendant had already
spent 132 days in jail."15
2. Bail Provisions
In some states, a judge protects alleged or potential victims through
the bail process by increasing the likelihood of the defendant's deten-
tion.116 In Ohio, courts must consider certain factors before establishing
bail such as: the alleged perpetrator's history of violence, mental health,
history of violating court orders, the level of the threat, and how detention
interferes with treatment or counseling for the alleged perpetrator." 17
In Illinois, a court may deny bail if the release of the defendant "poses
a real and present threat to the physical safety of the alleged victim of the
offense, and denial of release on bail or personal recognizance is neces-
sary to prevent fulfillment of the threat upon which the charge is
based."118 These provisions present unique problems regarding the de-
fendant's due process rights. 1 9 In Georgia, as a condition of bail the
court may prohibit the defendant from appearing at the victim's school,
work or other location where the victim may be present.' 20
108. Hunzeker, supra note 107, at 3. The first person sentenced in California, Mark
David BleakIey, received probation and was ordered to serve time in a psychiatric facility.
Beck et aL., supra note 15, at 60. He wandered away from the facility and appeared outside
the victim's health club where police apprehended him. Id. His subsequent conviction
yielded three years in prison. Id.
109. Terry Wilson, Stalking Law Sees First Conviction; Man Gets 2-Year Sentence for Tenorizing
Ex-Girlfriend, Cmn. Tim., Nov. 25, 1992, at 3.
110. Curtis Lawrence, Frst Stalking TialResults in Acquittal CI. Tam., Dec. 19, 1992, at 6.






116. See, e.g., I.t. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, Para. 5/110-6.3 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
117. 1992 Ohio Laws 536.
118. IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/110-6.3(a); seealso GA. CoDEANN. § 17-6-1(b) (3) (B)
(Michie Supp. 1993) ("the judge of a court of inquiry'may impose such conditions on the
defendant which may be necessary to deter further stalking of the victim, including but not
limited to denying bail or pretrial release"). These types of provisions may give victims the
courage to file charges against a stalker. See Nightline supra note 16.
119. See discussion infra part M.D.
120. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1(b) (3) (A).
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3. Warrantless Arrest
A number of states allow police to arrest alleged stalkers without a
warrant as long as the officer has probable cause to believe the stalking
occurred. 12 1 New Hampshire requires the officer to believe the stalking
incident occurred within six hours in order to arrest without a warrant.
1 22
Many states like Maine and Minnesota also provide for arrest without a
warrant where the stalker violates a restraining order already in place.
123




If the offense of stalking occurs in violation of a protection order in
Massachusetts, the defendant must serve the mandatory sentence with no
eligibility for probation, parole, furlough, work release, or sentence reduc-
tion for good conduct.' 2 5 Under Michigan's law, a misdemeanor convic-
tion yields a maximum of five years probation while a felony conviction
results in a mandatory five years probation.126 Texas prohibits the grant-
ing of any furloughs to defendants convicted of stalking.
127
5. Other Provisions
Michigan, in focusing on the needs of the victim, provides for a rebut-
table presumption that stalking occurred where the defendant's actions
took place after the victim asked the defendant to discontinue any con-
tacts.128 In addition, victims in Michigan may file a civil suit for damages
against their stalkers.
2 9
Colorado's law creates an express duty for peace officers to respond
to stalking complaints and to cooperate with the victim.' 30 This provision
could prove very useful given the number of restraining orders that are
not enforced.' 3 '
121. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.084 (West Supp. 1993) ("Any law enforcement officer
may arrest, without a warrant, any person he or she has probable cause to believe has violated
the provisions of this section"); 1992 Ohio Laws 234 (allowing for specified peace officers to
arrest and detain, pending a warrant, any person believed to be guilty of committing menac-
ing by stalking or aggravated trespass). See also 1993 Ind. Legis. Serv. 242 (West) (to be
codified at INn. CoDE § 35-45-10); 1993 Md. Laws 205 (to be codified at MD. CODE § 27-
121B); 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. 28 (Purdon).
122. 1993 N.H. Laws 173.
123. E.g., 1993 Me. Legis. Serv. 475 (West); MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.748 (West Supp.
1993).
124. See discussion infra part III.C.
125. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West Supp. 1993).
126. MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 771.2 (West 1982).
127. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (West Supp. 1993).
128. MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.411h-.411i (West Supp. 1993).
129. Id. at § 600.2954.
130. COLO. Rav. STAT. § 18-9-111(6) (Supp. 1993). This provision should address any
concerns similar to those expressed in Lardner, supra note 38.
131. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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Colorado also recently began an experimental program to decrease
the number of domestic violence offenders.' 32 In Arapahoe County, a
known offender wears an electronic bracelet that sounds an alarm if the
offender goes near the person who filed the harassment complaint.' 33
The device broadcasts a simultaneous signal to the police through a com-
munications center.1 34 The victim, knowing the police are on the way,
receives training in how to handle the offender should he come near.1 5
At pretrial and upon conviction, the offender is given the option of
wearing the bracelet, going to jail, or posting bond.'3 6 In addition, of-
fenders receive treatment while wearing the bracelet to discourage any
further obsessive behavior.1
t 7
Some states require the court to notify the victim at certain junctures
during sentencing or incarceration.13 8 Georgia provides notice to any
stalking victim of: 1) any bail hearing scheduled for the defendant; 2) the
defendant's release from custody; and 3) the defendant's escape from
prison. 139 These provisions permit a stalking victim to appear at the bail
hearing to argue for higher bail and also provide the victim notice when
the stalker is back on the streets.
Other provisions empower the court to request a psychiatric evalua-
tion or some type of counseling for the defendant. 140 Montana even
holds the defendant liable for all medical, counseling, or other costs in-
curred by the victim as a result of being stalked.14 1
I. ARE STALKING LAWS CONSTITUTIONAL?
The wide variety of statutes passed by state legislatures raises concerns
about the differing provisions, penalties, and effects. Critics of the legisla-
tion primarily voice concern over the constitutionality and effectiveness of
these statutes.1 4 2 Four main constitutional issues exist to date: 1) are the
statutes void because they are unconstitutionally vague; 2) do the statutes
criminalize conduct otherwise protected by the First Amendment thereby
making them overbroad; 3) do warrantless arrest provisions such as Flor-
ida's violate the Fourth Amendment; and, 4) do some statutes contain pro-
visions which violate the defendant's due process rights?






138. See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 46-9-108 (1993); TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (West
Supp. 1993).
139. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-93 (Michie Supp. 1993).
140. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-835.3
(Michie Supp. 1993); HAW. REv. STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992); IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730,
para. 5/3-14-5 (Smith-Hurd 1993); MrCu. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.411h-.411i (West Supp.
1993); 1992 Ohio Laws 234.
141. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 (1993).
142. Guy, Jr., supra note 38, at 1009-22. See generally Nightline supra note 16 (discussing
the pros and cons of recent anti-stalking legislation towards the accused).
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A. Vagueness
Under the due process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, federal and state statutes must be written with sufficient
clarity or they will be declared unconstitutionally vague.143 As articulated
by the Supreme Court, "a statute which either forbids or requires the do-
ing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due pro-
cess of law."144 Two primary issues are analyzed to determine if a particu-
lar statute is vague: whether the statute provides adequate notice to the
individual so that she may conform her conduct to the requirements of
the law;14 5 and more importantly as viewed by the Supreme Court,




The concept of notice is grounded in notions of fairness, 147 and
holds a constitutionally-protected status in relation to the individual.
148
Conduct must be defined by the government as criminal before the gov-
ernment treats it as such.' 4 9 Otherwise, any law enforcement agent could
declare anyone's conduct a crime at any time. 150 Such discretionary
power would wreak havoc on any civilized or organized society.151
Notice requirements are realistic, however, in that the Court does not
place specificity requirements on the legislature that are impossible to
143. Lanzetta v. NewJersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("No one may be required at peril
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.").
144. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
145. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); see generaly John C.
Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 205
(1985).
146. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162, 168-171; see alsoJeffries, supra note 145, at 215.
147. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). "Notice is essential to fairness.
Crimes must be defined in advance so that individuals have fair warning of what is forbidden:
lack of notice poses a 'trap for the innocent' and 'violates the first essential of due process of
law." Id. See alsoJeffries, supra note 145, at 205 (footnote omitted).
148. See Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 544-46 (1971) (per curiam) (statute that
failed to provide notice to an ordinary citizen that "discharging a friend at an apartment
house and then talking on a car radio while parked on the street" was prohibited as unconsti-
tutionally vague).
149. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 163; see alsoJeffries, supra note 145, at 205.
150. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 165, 170.
151. The Supreme Court shunned arbitrary power under the Due Process clause as early
as 1884. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1884) ("Arbitrary power, enforcing its
edicts to the injury of the persons and property of its subjects, is not law, whether manifested
as the decree of a personal monarch or of an impersonal multitude."). See also Coates v. City
of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (conviction depended on "whether or not a police-
man is annoyed"); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 120 (1969) ("To let a policeman's
command become equivalent to a criminal statute comes dangerously near making our gov-
ernment one of men rather than laws.").
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meet.15 2 The Court considers the difficulties in drafting a statute in order
to meet both sides of the balancing test in any vagueness challenge. 153
2. Arbitrary and Discriminatory Enforcement
The Supreme Court historically disfavors unjustified law enforcement
power.154 In relation to the vagueness doctrine, the Court recently high-
lighted the prevention of arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement as
the primary goal of the doctrine.' 55 Kolender'5 6 involved a California stat-
ute which required persons suspected of loitering on the street to present
identification when asked by a peace officer. 15 7 The Court found the stat-
ute vested complete discretion in the officer to determine whether or not
the identification presented was "credible and reliable," thereby making
the provision unconstitutionally vague. 15 8 The government argued the
need for stronger law enforcement to combat the increase in crime.' 59
The Court, however, refused to permit such broad legislation which "nec-
essarily 'entrusted lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of the
policeman on his beat.'"160
3. Potential Outcomes to Vagueness Challenge
In deciding whether or not a statute is unconstitutionally vague, the
court must undergo a balancing test between securing the defendant's
rights of notice and proper enforcement against providing enough flexi-
bility for the law to operate. 161 Realistically, the analysis focuses on the
type of conduct the legislature wants to prevent and whether the statute is
152. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) ("[W]e can never expect
mathematical certainty from our language.").
153. See Colten, 407 U.S. at 110.
154. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876).
155. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983). In his commentary, Jeffries high-
lights the Court's rationale in Kolender regarding the susceptibility of the law in question to
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as "the most persuasive justification for vagueness
review generally." Jeffries, supra note 145, at 218.
156. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
157. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 353. CAL. PENAL- CODE. ANN. § 647(e) (West 1970) at that time
provided:
Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct,
a misdemeanor... (e) Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to
place without apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and
to account for his presence when requested by a peace officer so to do, if the sur-
rounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public
safety demands such identification.
Kokender, 461 U.S. at 353 n.1.
158. Id. at 358.
159. Id. at 361.
160. Id. at 360 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974)).
161. See, e-g., Coton, 407 U.S. at 110.
The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea offairness. It is not a principle
designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in draw-
ing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human
conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of con-
duct are prohibited.
Id. See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). "The degree
of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates-as well as the relative importance offair notice
and fair enforcement-depends in part on the nature of the enactment." Id.
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likely to produce the particular results intended.' 6 2 Statutes that regulate
activity within the expected reign of government usually survive vagueness
challenges, 163 while statutes which extend governmental control too far
usually fail.1
6 4
When a court finds that the statute does not meet proper notice re-
quirements or subjects the public to arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment, it declares the law either facially vague or partially vague.165 A
facially vague law implies that the conduct demanded by the statute can-
not be readily ascertained from its language. The court upholds a facial
challenge only if the law is "impermissibly vague in all of its
applications."'
66
A partially vague statute involves "a hard core of circumstances to
which the statute unquestionably applies and as to which the ordinary per-
son would have no doubt as to its application." 167 Under these circum-
stances, the court finds the law unconstitutional only as applied to a
particular defendant.'6 The law will not be struck down in its entirety.'6 9
Instead, the court will attempt to "cure" the statute either through judicial
interpretation or a scienter requirement 70
162. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67 (1960). Amsterdam believes that the vagueness doctrine "is a means for
securing the Court's control over the methods by which governmental compulsion may be
brought to bear on the individual." Id. at 115.
163. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 (1988) (picketing at foreign embassies);
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (interfering with police activity); Cameron v.
Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1968) (picketing at courthouse).
164. See, e.g., Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 292-93 (1963) (rejecting conviction of six
black men under breach of the peace statute for playing basketball in a public park); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433-36 (1963) (invalidating statue regulating solicitation of legal
clients).
165. Amsterdam, supra note 162, at 109-10.
166. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495. See also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
611 n.1 (1971) (holding facially invalid a municipal ordinance making it a crime "to assem-
ble.., on any of the sidewalks... [and to] conduct [oneself] in a manner annoying to
persons passing by.. .).
167. Rex A. Collings, Jr., Unconstitutional Uncertainty - An Appraisa4 40 CoRNM.L L.Q.
195, 206 (1955). See U.S. v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947).
168. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495, 503.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 498-99.
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Three types of representative stalking laws are -analyzed below for
vagueness: California's narrow law,17 1 Florida's broad law, 172 and Michi-
gan's intermediate provision. 173
171. CAL PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993). The statute currently reads:
(a) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses
another person and who makes a credible threatwith the intent to place that per-
son in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury or to place that person in
reasonable fear of the death or great bodily injury of his or her immediate family is
guilty of the crime of stalking, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not
more than one year of by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or
by both that fine and imprisonment.
(b) Any person who violates subdivision (a) -when there is a temporary re-
straining order, injunction, or any other court order in effect prohibiting the behav-
ior described in subdivision (a) against the same party, is punishable by
imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or by a fine of not more
than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment, or by
imprisonment in the state prison.
(c) A second or subsequent conviction occurring within seven years of a prior
conviction under subdivision (a) against the same victim, and'involving an act of
violence or a "credible threat" of violence, as defined in subdivision (f), is punish-
able by imprisonment in a countyjail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment,
or by imprisonment in the state prison.
(d) Every person who, having been convicted of a felony under this section,
commits a second or subsequent violation of this section against the same victim
and involving an act of violence or "a credible threat" of violence, as defined in
subdivision (f), is punishable in state prison, for 16 months, two or three years and a
fine up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
(e) For the purposes of this section, "harasses" means a knowing and willful
course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, ha-
rasses, or terrorizes the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose. The course
of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the per-
son. "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts
over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitu-
tionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of "course of
conduct."
(f) For the purposes of this section, "a credible threat" means a threat made
with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the
person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the
safety of his or her immediate family. The threat must be against the life of, or a
threat to cause great bodily injury to, a person as defined in Section 12022.7.
(g) This section shall not apply to conduct which occurs during labor
picketing.
(h) If probation is granted, or the execution or imposition of a sentence is
suspended, for any person convicted under this section, it shall be a condition of
probation that the person participate in counseling, as designated by the court.
However, the court, upon a showing of good cause, may fined that the counseling
requirement shall not be imposed.
(i) The court shall also consider issuing an order restraining the defendant
from any contact with the victim, that may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined
by the court. It is the intent of the Legislature that the length of any restraining
order be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of
future violations, and the safety of the victim and his or her immediate family. The
duration of the restraining order may be longer than five years only in an extreme
case, where a longer duration is necessary to protect the safety of the victim or his or
her immediate family.
Id.
172. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West Supp. 1993). See infra note 180 for full text of
Florida's statute.
173. MicH. COmp. LAws ANN. § 750.411h-.411i (West Supp. 1993). See infra note 193 for
full text of Michigan's statute.
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a. California
In California, stalking requires the conduct of willful, malicious, and
repeated following or harassing of a person, plus a credible threat with
intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury.174
The law links the conduct of following or harassing with a "credible
threat"-behavior otherwise punishable under criminal law.175 Given that
the underlying offense of making threats does not violate vagueness re-
quirements, the inclusion of willful following or harassing with making
threats should satisfy constitutional standards of notice.'
7 6
In addition, California's statute defines relevant terminology such as
"to harass" and "a credible threaL" 177 Therefore, those charged with en-
forcement of the law can refer to the definitions to determine whether
specific conduct is prohibited. This should prevent arbitrary or discrimi-




Florida's law, on the other hand, criminalizes the act of willfully, mali-
ciously, and repeatedly following or harassing another person. 180 This
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9.
175. See CAL. PENAL CoDE §§ 701-703 (West 1985).
176. See Guy, Jr., supra note 38, at 1014. The threat requirement makes it possible to
distinguish innocent conduct from criminal conduct. Id. This is an example of how addition
of a scienter requirement mitigates against vagueness. See id. ("The threat provision strongly
mitigates against vagueness in the statute because it requires that the stalker demonstrate a
tangible intent to cause emotional harm.").
177. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993). "'[Hlarasses' means a knowing and
willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, ha-
rasses or terrorizes the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose." Id. at § 649.9(e)
"'[A] credible threat' means a threat made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry
out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for
his or her safety...." Id. at § 649.9(f).
178. See Guy, Jr., supra note 38, at 1015-16. This article contains an analysis of all poten-
tially vague terms in the California statute, resolving that California's statute should survive
any vagueness challenges. Id.
179. Id.
180. FLA- STAT. ANN. § 784.048(2) (West Supp. 1993). Florida's law currently provides:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Harasses" means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legiti-
mate purpose.
(b) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of
acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Con-
stitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of "course of con-
duct." Such constitutionally protected activity includes picketing or other
organized protests.
(c) "Credible threat" means a threat made with the intent to cause the person
who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. The threat
must be against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily injury to, a person.
(2) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses an-
other person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(3) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses an-
other person, and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in
reasonable fear of death or bodily injury, commits the offense of aggravated stalk-
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raises two concerns. First, no threat or intent to harm is required, thus
punishing the mere presence of a person. This makes distinguishing legal
from illegal behavior difficult. 81 For example, an investigative reporter
following the subject of his story on more than one occasion engages in
proscribed conduct under this statute.
1 8 2
Second, while the statute does define "to harass," no definition of "fol-
lowing" exists.I8 3 What then constitutes following? How far must one "fol-
low" to break the law? How closely must one follow? Could trailing
behind a person for a few blocks to get a better view because she looked
familiar constitute stalking? One commentator noted that even a football
player chasing an opponent may satisfy "willful, malicious and repeated
following." 18 4 This ambiguity suggests the statute fails to meet the
Supreme Court's standard of definiteness and clarity.'
85
Florida's law also leaves room for arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement. The statute's ambiguity forces police to rely on the perception
of the person stalked because the statute fails to provide adequate criteria
for determining the alleged stalker's intent. Under this law, a distraught
victim escaping from a stalker who has repeatedly followed her may enlist
the aid of a beat cop nearby. So too may an over sensitive woman com-
mand the sympathies of the same police officer against someone who in-
nocently walked behind her for some distance. This latter example clearly
does not meet the legislature's intention to protect from the "needless
torment caused by stalking." 18 6
Moreover, Florida's law provides for police officers to arrest stalking
suspects without a warrant,' 87 compounding the discretion given to the
police. This gives the officer the power to arrest someone based purely on
his own suspicions or on the word of the victim. The Supreme Court ex-
plicitly prohibits such unbridled discretion through the vagueness doc-
ing, a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or
s. 775.084.
(4) Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat violence
pursuant to s. 784.046, or an injunction for protection against domestic violence
pursuant to s. 741.30, or after any other court-imposed prohibition of conduct to-
ward the subject person or that person's property, knowingly, willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the offense of aggra-
vated stalking, a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s.
775.083, or's. 775.084.
(5) Any law enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant, any person he or
she has probable cause to believe has violated the provisions of this section.
FA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048.
181. See Nightline, supra note 16. Accord Guy, Jr., supra note 38, at 1017.
182. SeeFLA STAT. ANN. § 784.048(1)(a).
183. See FA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048.
184. Thomas, supra note 7, at 9.
185. See also, Guy, Jr., supra note 38, at 1017. "[P]olice officers, prosecutors, and juries
have no standards by which to determine that [a defendant] has violated the stalking statute.
Whether certain conduct constitutes stalking becomes a matter of discretion." Id. Cf.
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a statute requiring
persons who loitered on the streets to identify themselves and account for their presence to a
police officer upon request).
186. See FA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048, pmbl.
187. Id. at § 784.048(5).
19931
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trine.188 Ultimately, Florida's anti-stalking law does not clarify what
activities as a whole are prohibited, 18 9 and its ambiguity allows for arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement. Therefore, this law will most likely
fall to a facial attack.190
c. Michigan,
Michigan's law, more similar to California's than Florida's, involves a
"willful course of conduct" that would cause reasonable fear in the victim
and does cause such fear.' 9 ' While California's law focuses on the actions
188. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58, Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
162-70 (1972).
189. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
190. At least three Florida judges have ruled Florida's law is unconstitutionally vague. Jill
J. Spitz, Deciion Delivers Blow to FKoridazs Anti-StalkingLaw, ORLANo SENTn, Aug. 3, 1993, at
1; Judge Anti-Stalking Law Unconstitutional, Mri HEALDm, May 21, 1993, at B5; Defense Wins
Challenge to State's Anti-Stalking Law, Mmsir HERALD, Mar. 9, 1993, at 2. But see Guy, Jr., supra
note 38, at 1017-19. The author found that Florida's statute is unconstitutionally vague
where it proscribes malicious following, but survives vagueness challenges where it proscribes
harassment. Id. He also determined that Florida's aggravated stalking provision is sufficient.
Id.
Other states facing constitutional challenges to their stalking laws include Georgia, Illi-
nois, and Virginia. See Macon Morehouse, New Anti-Stalking Law Questioned byjudgefor Lack of
Guidelines, ATLkrrAJ. AND CoNsr., June 4, 1993, at G3; Charles Mount, Stalking Law Survives
1st Test CHI. Twa., June 18, 1993, at 4; Cathryn Creno, Victims of Abuse Call for Legal Help,
Aluz. REPuBLIc, May 18, 1993, at El.
191. MICH. Con. LAws ANN. § 750.411h-.411i (West Supp. 1993). These sections state:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of 2
or more separate noncontinuous acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose.
(b) "Emotional distress" means significant mental suffering or distress that
may, but does not necessarily require, medical or other professional treatment or
counseling.
(c) "Harassment" means conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but
is not limited to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact, that would cause a
reasonable individual to suffer emotional distress, and that actually causes the vic-
tim to suffer emotional distress. Harassment does not include coustitutionally pro-
tected activity or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose.
(d) "Stalking" means a willful course of conduct involving repeated or contin-
uing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to fell
terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested, and that ac-
tually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened,
harassed, or molested.
(e) "Unconsented contact" means any contact with another individual that is
initiated or continued without that individual's consent, or in disregard of that indi-
vidual's expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued. Uncon-
sented contact includes, but is not limited to, any of the following.
(i) Following or appearing within the sight of that individual.
(ii) Approaching or confronting that individual in a public or on a pri-
vate property.
(iii) Appearing at the workplace or residence of that individual.
(iv) Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occu-
pied by that individual.
(v) Contacting that individual by telephone.
(vi) Sending mail or electronic communications to that individual.
(vii) Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned,
leased, or occupied by that individual.
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(f) "Victim" means an individual who is the target of a willful course of con-
duct involving repeated or continuing harassment.
(2) An individual who engages in stalking is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable
by imprisonment for not more than I year or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or
both.
(3) The court may place an individual convicted of violating subsection (2) on
probation for a term of not more than 5 years. If a term of probation is ordered,
the court may, in addition to any other lawful condition of probation, order the
defendant to do any of the following.
(a) Refrain from stalking any individual during the term of probation.,
(b) Refrain from having any contact with the victim of the offense.
(c) Be evaluated to determine the need for psychiatric, psychological, or so-
cial counseling and, if determined appropriate by the court, to receive psychiatric,
psychological, or social counseling at his or her own expense.
(4) In a prosecution for a violation of this section, evidence that the defendant
continued to engage in a course of conduct involving repeated unconsented con-
tact with the victim after having been requested by the victim to discontinue the
same or a different form of unconsented contact, and to refrain from any further
unconsented contact with the victim, shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption that
the continuation of the course of conduct caused the victim to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.
(5) A criminal penalty provided for under this section may be imposed in addi-
tion to any penalty that may be imposed for any other criminal offense arising from
the same conduct or for any contempt of court arising from the same conduct.
Section 750.411i, Aggravated stalking provides:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of 2
or more separate noncontinuous acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose.
(b) "Credible threat" means a threat to kill another individual or a threat to
inflict physical injury upon another individual that is made in any manner or in any
context that causes the individual hearing or receiving the threat to reasonably fear
for his or her safety or the safety of another individual.
(c) "Emotional distress" means significant mental suffering or distress that
may, but does not necessarily require, medical or other professional treatment or
counseling.
(d) "Harassment" means conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but
is not limited to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact, that would cause a
reasonable individual to suffer emotional distress, and that actually causes the vic-
tim to suffer emotional distress. Harassment doeg not include constitutionally pro-
tected activity or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose.
(e) "Stalking" means a willful course of conduct involving repeated or contin-
uing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel
terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested, and that ac-
tually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened,
harassed, or molested.
(f) "Unconsented contact" means any contact with another individual that is
initiated or continued without that individual's consent, or in disregard of that indi-
vidual's expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued. Uncon-
sented contact includes, but is not limited to, any of the following.
(i) Following or appearing within the sight of that individual may, but
does not necessarily require, medical or other professional treatment or counseling.
(ii) Approaching or confronting that individual in a public place or on
private property.
(iii) Appearing at the workplace or residence of that individual.
(iv) Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occu-
pied by that individual.
(v) Contacting that individual by telephone.
(vi) Sending mail or electronic communications to that individual.
(vii) Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned,
leased, or occupied by that individual.
(g) "Victim" means an individual who is the target of a willful course of con-
duct involving repeated or continuing harassment.
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of the stalker in making a credible threat,192 Michigan's law focuses more
on the perspective of the victim in feeling some "reasonable fear."' 9 3 Reli-
ance on the subjective feelings of the victim, however, makes it difficult for
the defendant to predict what behavior will be found threatening. The
statute compensates for this subjective element by including a list of repre-
sentative contacts which qualify as violative behavior in order to put a po-
tential defendant on notice.19 4 That list includes: approaching or
confronting the person in a public or private place, following or appear-
ing within sight of the person, or appearing at the person's workplace.' 9 5
The sufficient notice requirements are therefore satisfied because a per-
son is able to ascertain whether his conduct violates the statute.
In addition, the law requires two or more separate noncontinuous
acts evidencing a continuity of purpose on the part of the defendant.
196
While following someone to get a closer look may cause fear in the mind
of the person being followed, no violation occurs if it happens only
once. 19 7 Plus, arrest comes only after two events within the same scheme,
significantly narrowing the circumstances under which enforcement oc-
(2) An individual who engages in stalking is guilty of aggravated stalking if the
violation involves any of the following circumstances:
(a) The actions constituting the offense are in violation of a restraining order
and the individual has received actual notice of that restraining order, or the ac-
tions are in violation of an injunction or preliminary injunction.
(b) The actions constituting the offense are in violation of a condition of
probation, a condition of pretrial release, or a condition of release on bond pend-
ing appeal.
(c) The course of conduct includes the making of 1 or more credible threats
against the victim, a member of the victim's family, or another individual living in
the victim's household.
(d) The defendant has been previously convicted of a violation of this section
or section 411h. [FN1]
(3) Aggravated stalking is a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more
than 5 years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both.
(4) The court may place an individual convicted of violating this section on pro-
bation for any term of years, but not less than 5 years. If a term of probation is
ordered, the court may, in addition to any other lawful condition of probation,
order the defendant to do any of the following:
(a) Refrain from stalking any individual during the term of probation.
(b) Refrain from any contact with the victim of the offense.
(c) Be evaluated to determine the need for psychiatric, psychological, or so-
cial counseling, and, if determined appropriate by the court, to receive psychiatric,
psychological, or social counseling at his or her own expense.
(5) In a prosecution for a violation of this section, evidence that the defendant
continued to engage in a course of conduct involving repeated unconsented con-
tact with the victim after having been requested by the victim to discontinue the
same or a different form of unconsented contact, and to refrain from any further
unconsented contact with the victim, shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption that
the continuation of the course of conduct caused the victim to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.
(6) A criminal penalty provided for under this section may be imposed in addi-
tion to any penalty that may be imposed for any other criminal offense arising from
the same conduct or for contempt of court arising from the same conduct.
192. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
193. Mans. Com. LAws ANN. § 750.411h(c), (d).
194. Id. at §§ 750.411h(e)(i)-(vii), 411i(f)(i)-(vii).
195. Id.
196. Id. at §§ 750.411h(a), 411i(a).
197. See id.
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curs. 198 This precludes arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Michi-
gan's law, therefore, should not fail for vagueness. 199
B. Overbreadth
The overbreadth doctrine is one exception to the rule requiring that
in order for a statute to be facially vague it must be vague under every
applicable application. 20 0 Overbreadth concerns enactments with "a gov-
ernmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject
to state regulation [which] may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of [constitutionally] pro-
tected freedoms." 20 1 The Supreme Court demands a higher standard of
precision in drafting legislation affecting individual rights because citizens
will "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone.., than if the boundaries of the
forbidden areas were clearly marked.'"
20 2
A defendant's challenge to this type of enactment, even if her con-
duct clearly violates it, will go forward due to the court's sensitivity to is-
sues such as First Amendment freedoms.20  In order to win a facially
overbroad attack, the plaintiff must show: 1) the protected activity is a
significant part of the law's target, and 2) that no satisfactory method ex-
ists of severing the law's unconstitutional applications from its constitu-
tional ones.204 If a court finds the statute infringes upon constitutionally
protected freedoms beyond necessity and no feasible means of severing
the unconstitutional language exists, the law will be struck down even if
enacted for a legitimate state purpose.205
Clearly the government's purpose in enacting anti-stalking legislation
is legitimate. In order to address concerns regarding the statute's effect
on activities protected by the First Amendment, most stalking laws provide
exceptions for applications to "constitutionally protected conduct."206
Some laws go further and specify what conduct is exempt from prosecu-
tion.20 7 Are these exceptions enough? Or do they subsequently make the
laws unconstitutionally vague? Could a legislature draft these provisions
more narrowly?208
The phrase "constitutionally protected conduct" by itself seems re-
dundant.20 9 If the activity falls under constitutional protection, the statute
198. See id.
199. For similar analysis regarding Connecticut's stalking statute, see Guy, Jr., supra note
38, at 1020-22.
200. See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982).
201. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
202. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 n.6 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372
(1964)).
203. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495.
204. LARamcE H. TRIBE, AM ElCAN CONsTrrUoTONAL Lw, § 12-24 (1978).
205. See NAACP, 377 U.S. at 307-08.
206. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
208. For an example of one author's proposed stalking statute, see GuyJr., supra note 38,
at 1022-27.
209. Thomas, supra note 7, at 10.
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cannot change that. Additionally, the Supreme Court requires only stat-
utes which regulate conduct in a substantially overbroad manner to be
struck down. 210 If the statute only affects occasional unconstitutional ap-
plications while maintaining a close nexus between the legislative intent
and the allowable level of enforcement, the statute may not be
invalidated.
2 11
The concerns raised about civil liberties and stalking laws, 21 2 assum-
ing these laws do not fail for other vagueness reasons, seem exaggerated
given the requirements for overbreadth. Any false claims against the in-
vestigative reporter, or the father who watches from his parked car the
children he lost custody of, will most likely be struck as individual uncon-
stitutional applications. But, ultimately the nexus between government in-
terests and the interests of the legislature to protect from stalking behavior
should prove strong enough to survive.
C. Fourth Amendment
Civil rights experts fear that anti-stalking laws such as Florida's, which
authorize arrests without a warrant, may violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.2 13 Florida's stalking law provides, "an officer may arrest without a
warrant, any person he or she has probable cause to believe violated the
act."2 14 Critics argue the provision allows police to falsely arrest a suspect
merely upon an alleged victim's word.2 15 Under the statute, an angry wife
may conceivably file stalking charges against her cheating husband solely
to see him get arrested.
Circumstances do exist, however, where a suspect may be legitimately
arrested without a warrant. 216 Under common law, either a misdemeanor
committed in the presence of an officer 2 17 or a felony committed in or
outside the presence of an officer justifies a warrantless arrest.
2 18
In addition, because the requirement that the violation occur in front
of an officer originates from common law and not the Fourth Amend-
210. Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("[O]verbreadth... must not
only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep.").
211. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (statute prohibiting picketing "near"
courthouse upheld against overbreadth challenge).
212. See Nightline supra note 16; Gary Spencer, State Tightens Penaltiesfor Stalking, N.Y. LJ.,
at 1, Aug. 20, 1992. According to Phil Gutis, spokesman for the ACLU, his organization will
watch to make sure that anti-stalking laws are not being implemented by overeager prosecu-
tors to violate individual constitutional rights. Id.
213. See Nightline, supra note 16. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
214. FA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(5) (West Supp. 1993).
215. See Nightline, supra note 16.
216. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975).




ment, the Supreme Court held that the states may expand the power to
arrest without a warrant through statute or Constitutional amendment.
2 1 9
Therefore, as long as the warrantless arrest provision does not violate the
Constitution, its validity rests upon the law of the state where the arrest
occurred.22 0 In most states, an arrest will not require a warrant as long as
the officer can establish probable cause.
2 21
No specific guidelines exist to define probable cause. The Supreme
Court labelled it as "a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules."222 When a police officer receives
knowledge or information regarding facts 'and circumstances sufficient to
cause a reasonable belief that an offense occurred, the officer may arrest
the suspect without a warrant.
223
Some states currently provide for warrantless arrests upon probable
cause within their domestic abuse statutes.2 2 4 Other states provide for
warrantless arrests at the scene of the incident with probable cause that an
offense was committed, or if a protective order was violated.2 25 Constitu-
tional challenges to these statutes have failed.2 26 The courts held that the
states' interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of abused wo-
men outweighed the individual defendant's right to privacy.
2 27
A similar argument exists under anti-stalking legislation that the
state's interests outweigh the alleged stalker's right to liberty although the
balance of the scales appear much closer because the proscribed conduct
is more difficult to ascertain.2 28 Support for the mandatory arrest provi-
sion in domestic abuse legislation exists in everyjurisdiction.2 29 Given the
rapid response of the states in passing anti-stalking legislation, and the
states' broad power to enact laws to protect the general health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens, support for mandatory arrest provisions in anti-stalk-
ing legislation may soon follow and should survive Fourth Amendment
challenges.
219. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 756 (1984) (White, J., with Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
220. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963).
221. See Watson, 423 U.S. at 421-22 (1976); Fields v. City of S. Houston, Tex., 922 F.2d
1183, 1189 (5th Cir. 1991).
222. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
223. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
224. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(5) (West 1981 & Supp. 1992); N.C. GE.N.
STAT. § 50B-4 (Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8(1) (1989 & Supp. 1993).
225. See, e.g., Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(B) (1989 & Supp. 1992); FLA. STA. ANN.
§§ 901-15(6)-(7) (West 1984 & Supp. 1993); MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (West 1983 & Supp.
1993).
226. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Errington, 310 N.W.2d 681, 682 (Minn. 1981) (holding the
Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act constitutional); Missouri ex teL Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d
223, 236 (Mo. 1982) (holding the Missouri Adult Abuse Act constitutional).
227. See, e.g., Williams, 626 S.W.2d at 230.
228. See supra part III.A.
229. Greg Anderson, Sorichetti v. City of New York Tells the Police That Liability Looms for
Failure to Respond to Domestic Violence Situations, 40 U. MIAeI L. REv. 333, 353 (1985).
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D. Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prevents state
governments from depriving individuals of "life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law."230 What is meant by "life" is unquestionable. The
definition of property has developed through case law over the years.
23 1
The definition of liberty, however, remains somewhat obscure.2 32 Tradi-
tional notions of liberty include one's right to be free from restraint of
physical liberty along with those rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.
233
Once an individual's liberty interest is at issue, the court determines
what procedural process is due before the individual can be deprived of
that interest. 23 4 In Matthews v. Eldridge, the Court weighed three factors to
determine whether any process was due: 1) the importance of the individ-
ual interest; 2) the reliability of the current process or the risk of errone-
ous deprivation; and 3) the importance of the government interest.
23 5
With regard to anti-stalking laws, the procedural due process analysis
arises in two important contests - ex parte restraining orders and the de-
nial of bail.
236
1. Ex Parte Restraining Orders
In some states, the court can issue a protective order without notice to
the offending party upon the presentment of evidence of abuse or immi-
nent danger of abuse.23 7 One domestic violence case argued that ex parte
orders violated the defendant's due process rights because the defendant
was not given timely notice or an opportunity to be heard before being
denied access to his property and his children. 23 8 Although the ex parte
order in this case enjoined the defendant from his home, the court held
his rights were subordinate to the abused spouse's right to immediate pro-
tection from harm.2 3 9 The court found the government's interest in pro-
tecting its citizens outweighed the individual's Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights.
24
The analysis under anti-stalking legislation involves similar interests
and should obtain similar results. Whether or not there is a personal rela-
tionship between the victim and the stalker, the victim's right to be free
230. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV.
231. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (plaintiff's interest in being
rehired after one year contract expired did not equal property interest); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare payments deemed a property interest protected by constitution
against arbitrary withdrawal).
232. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) ("In a Constitution for a free
people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed.").
233. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
234. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See, e.g., Mica. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 600.2950a (West Supp. 1993); MnN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.748 (West Supp. 1993).
238. Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa.D & C.3d 767 (1979).
239. Id. at 773.
240. Id. at 774.
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from harassment militates against the defendant's rights to due process.
Each of the anti-stalking laws with ex parte provisions requires the victim
to demonstrate the immediacy of potential harm before the order will be
granted. 24 1 Additionally, because ex parte orders are issued only tempo-
rarily,242 the potential for erroneous deprivation is eliminated. 243 Overall,
the government's interest in protecting its citizens from harm outweighs
the defendant's right to notice and extensive procedures in the short
term. Therefore, these provisions for ex parte restraining orders should
not raise constitutional concerns.
2. No-Bail Provisions
As noted previously, both Illinois and Georgia allow judges to deny
bail to alleged stalkers in order to protect the victim.244 Although the due
process analysis requires the balancing of the same interests here as with
ex parte orders, the argument on behalf of the, defendant is somewhat
stronger due to the extent of liberty infringed.
245
One critic has identified the difficulty in denying bail in anti-stalking
situations.24 6 Susan Hillenbrand of the American Bar Association found
twenty-eight states allow the denial of bail only for capitol offenses while
eighteen states hold the purpose of bail is to secure the defendant's ap-
pearance in court, not to protect the community.2 47 In fact, Illinois' no-
bail provision was recently held unconstitutional under the Illinois
Constitution.
2 4 8
It seems likely that no-bail provisions will have a more difficult time
withstanding constitutional challenges than ex-parte restraining order
provisions due to the degree of liberty withheld. In order to serve the
purpose of protecting the victim from future harm, legislatures may have
to re-write existing policies behind the denial of bail to meet constitutional
241. See, e.g., MicH. Comp. IAws ANN. § 600.2950a (West Supp. 1993); MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.748 (West Supp. 1993).
242. See, e.g., MmnN. STAT. ANN. § 609.748(4).
243. See Boyle, 12 Pa.D & C.3d at 774..
244. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1(b) (3) (B) (Michie Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para.
5/110-6.3 (Smith-Hurd 1992). See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
245. The Eighth Amendment provides in part that "excessive bail shall not be required."
U.S. CoNsT. amend VIII. In certain situations, a defendant has a right to affordable bail. See
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
Like the ancient practice of securing oaths of responsible persons to stand as sure-
ties for the accused, the modem practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of
a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the presence
of the accused. Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to
fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment.
Id. (emphasis added).
246. George Lardner, Jr., Anti-Stalking Laws ProMliferate,. Several Face Court Challenges, WASH.
Posr, Apr. 30, 1993, at A2.
247. Id. In recent years, however, detention to prevent further criminal acts has become
permissible under certain circumstances. See U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987). "We
have repeatedly held that the Government's regulatory interest in community safety can, in
appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individuals liberty interest." Id.
248. David Bailey, CircuitJudgeFinds No-BailPMvisin of StalkingLaw to Be Unconstitutional,
Cm. DAi.Y L. Buu., Feb. 5, 1993, at 1.
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Anti-stalking legislation offers additional recourse for victims of stalk-
ers where prior criminal and civil remedies proved insufficient. Ultimately,
the issue remains whether or not anti-stalking legislation will prove effec-
tive in preventing stalking. The likely answer is both yes and no. As with
any other criminal law designed to punish and deter unacceptable behav-
ior, some will obey the laws and some will not. Especially in circumstances
where the stalker suffers from mental disturbance, the prospect of fines or
short jail sentences may only serve to heighten the frenzy.
Additionally, the specific concerns relative to the constitutionality of
these provisions need to be addressed. The need for protection of the
victims must be weighed against the rights of the accused. Some states
have begun to make the arguments and refine the language in their provi-
sions. Other states will undoubtedly follow. Perhaps the proposed federal
model legislation will assist in the discussion. Meanwhile, the recognition
must be made that in the interim, a definite number of lives will be saved.
Julie Miles Walker
249. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748.
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